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EFFECTS OF COMPENSATJON IN CONSUMER
EXPENDITURE STUDIES
uROBERT FERBER AND SEYMOUR SUDMAN
Studiesofthe effectsofoffering compensatiOn to respondents on consumer t'xpetidiiure surreyshare
focused on response rates and report ralidiy. This paper .sutntnarizes pre'uiousresearch results and
ident&ies the possible effects on one-time intertiews and on panelstudies. Although little information
exists on the effectsofthe amount and frequency of corn pensation, education and income !rels areknowit to
be relerant factors.
1. INTROE)UCTION
This paper attempts to summarize the effectsof offering compensati011 to
respondents on consumer expenditure surveys based onthe results of a number
of observational and experimental studies of thisquestion undertaken by the
University of Illinois and other institutions. It addressesitself to the evaluation
of two effects on such surveys--cooperation and reportvalidity. Cooperation we
define here as equivalent to the response rate,that is, the proportion of sample
households contacted that grant the desired interview(s).
Another aspect of cooperation. inducing those beinginterviewed to provide
more complete or more accurateinformation, is subsumed tinder our second major
heading. report validity. It is defined as theexpenditures (in units or amounts, as
the case may he) reported by the cooperatinghousehold in relation to the true,
unknown expenditure. In the absence of validatinginformation in most of these
studies, it is not possible to separate this factor into its twocomponents of more
complete information and greater accuracy of informationthat is reported.
Indeed, all that can be assumed, as will be shown later, isthat under the circum-
stances in which the studies were carried out, moreexpenditures means greater
reporting accuracy, with the partitioning of thisfactor between completeness and
accuracy left to later, morecomprehensive studies.
We begin by considering, in the next section, therationale for offering com-
pensation in consumer expenditure surveys, some ofthe types of compensation
that can be (and have been) offered, and what effects apriori reasoning leads us to
expect from such offers. Though any suchinferences are hound to be colored by
our ex post knowledge of theresults of these past studies, such reasoningshould
nevertheless serve a useful purpose by providing a morerigorous framework for
evaluating the meaning and significance of theempirical studies.
Section 3 reviews evidence from empirical studiesof the effect of compensa-
tion on cooperation, while Section 4 considers whatinformation these studies
provide on report validity. The final section bringstogether the results of the
preceding two sections and, with these results as a basis,attempts to draw some
generalizations regarding the types of conditions underwhich compensation
would seem desirable as well as questions on thistopic that would constitute the
basis for further research.
Before beginning, it is important to distinguish amongdifferent methods of
collecting expenditure information, since compensationprocedures and effects
319can vary substa ntially by these methods. For these purposes. three such methods
can be distinguished. One method is to collect this information by a one-time
interview with the household, as was done in the 1960 1961 and 1950 Consumer
Expenditure Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The interview in such
a case can be quite long, at times up to eight hours (which may he divided into two
or three sittings), and involves recall of expenditures for periods varying from one
week to a year depending on the type of expenditure.
A second method entails the creation of panels of households who are asked
to report expenditures periodically by direct interview, either a face-to-face
interview or by telephone. The recall is much shorter, usually not exceeding three
months, but involves much more cooperation on the part of the household over
time. This type of data collection method has been utilized much more in other
countries. such as in the surveys of income and expenditures undertaken by the
Latin American group of research institutes coordinated by the Brookings Institu-
tion [I], and in various experimental studies to be reported shortly.
The third method of data collection also involves panels of households but
with expenditures recorded in written diaries rather than reported orally. These
diaries usually cover short periods of time, usually not more than a week or two but
sometimes as long as a month. The use of these diaries tends to provide far more
detail on expenditures than can be obtained otherwise and. at least theoretically.
enables the respondent to record the expenditures immediately after they have
taken place and, hence, presumably with the greatest completeness and accuracy.
In the United States these diaries have been used primarily for supplementary data
collection, mainly for food and related expenditures, though they are being used
much more heavily in the current survey of consumer expenditures beingcon-
ducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the BLS.
2. WHY COMPENSAFE?
The general attitude in the past has been that compensationwas not needed
on expenditure surveys undertaken by governmental agencies. for tworeasons.
Since the data were being sought bya governmental agency, it was felt that people
would not expect to be paid and that they would consider theircooperation as a
public service. Second, there was the further feeling that whensuch data were
sought by a personal interview, even though considerablememory effort might be
required, the respondent would still receive psychic rewards fromthe social inter-
action with the interviewer in which he (or she) is thedominant figure. It seems to
have been essentially for these reasons that formany years in the United States no
compensation was offered on expenditure studiesby government agencies,
although marketing research firms seeking muchthe same information did offer
compensation, and are still doingso.
The shift toward the greateruse of diaries and written records on expenditure
surveys, brought about by the large body of evidenceon the substantial errors that
exist in expenditure data obtained by recall,has served to place increasingatten-
tion on possibly offering some form ofcompensation. Rising wage levels, increasing
labor force participation bywomen, and a tendency to involve familymembers
other than the housewife in these interviewshave all served to accentuate this
320trend. In effect, the rationale is that iccord-keeping and other forms of writing
are inherently distateful to most people, and they have to he encouraged to do so
by means of special incentives.
While marketing research firms have been using various methods of com-
pensation fora number of years, theirusc in expenditure surveys by governmental
agencies has only recently been considered, and some experiments evolving from
this consideration are discussed in the later sections of this paper. Thus it is not
surprising that most survey organizations do not compensate respondents for one-
time interviews while diary-keepers arc usually compensated either in cash or with
gifts. For panels where households report periodically to interviewers, there is
some tendency to compensate on some of the interviews, especially if the interview
is long and complex, and if the panel will be used for more than a year.
One other issue, for which we have only limited field information, is whether
the need for compensation is related to the type of survey organization. Thus,
some researchers argue on ethical grounds that when expenditure information is
collected for commercial purposes by a profit-making organization the respondent
should be compensated, while if the information is collected by a governmental or
other non-profit survey organization compensation is not required.
Compensation can take many forms. The most obvious form is a cash pay-
inent for granting the interview. This has been used by some commercial firms but
has been used very little by governmental agencies, since the amount of cash that
can be offered is usually not considered enough to influence the respondent to
cooperate if he is otherwise inclined. There are some exceptions, however, where
cash seems to be more convenient. Thus, where record-keeping is not required hut
long-term cooperation is necessary, the A. C. Nielsen Television Panel rewards
the household with fifty cents when the cartridge is removed from the television
set for mailing.
Merchandise gifts take many forms. Most pertinent, perhaps, is the distinction
between gifts given outright in exchange for a single interview and gifts given over a
period of time in exchange for cooperation in a panel. The MRCA National
Consumer Panel rewards households with gifts of their choice from an attractive
catalog similar to the one used by trading stamp companies. The advantage of gifts
rather than cash is that gifts may sometimes be purchased at reduced prices by the
researchers, so that the value to the respondent is greater than the outlay to the
survey organization. In addition, gifts act as a continuing reminder each time
they are used or observed.
A combination approach may also be used, such as offering one gift to a
household on the first interview to induce them to begin to cooperate and to offer
something else toward the completion of their service on the panel. Needless to
say, numerous alternatives are possible, and as of this writing very little inforrna-
tion is available on the relative effectiveness of these different alternatives.
The focus of this paper is on the effects of compensation on cooperation and
report validity relative to expenditure surveys conducted by non-profit or govern-
mental agencies. To the extent that compensation has any effect in these instances,
we would expect that merchandise offerings would have more effect than the of1r
of an equivalent cash amount, that merchandise of a less commercial nature would
be more effective than other types of merchandise, and that in the case of a panel
321study several gifts spread over time would be more effective than the same gift
offered at one point in time. We would also expect for economic reasons that the
effects would be more pronounced on lower income and poorly educated families.
Although none of the studies to be reported in the remainderofthis paper were
designed specifically with these individual hypotheses in mind, itisofinterest
nevertheless to examine the extent to which these hypotheses are supported by the
data.
3. EFFECT ON COOPERATION
Eight experiments or studies of the effect of compensation on coorperation
are reviewed in this section. Only two of these relate to a one-time interview. Of
the other six, two were panel studies seeking data by personal interview and four
were panel studies using the diary approach.
One-tune Iniern'iews
There is little evidence on the effects of compensation for single face-to-face
interviews, although there is substantial evidence that compensation improves
cooperation on mail questionnaires. (2, pp. 94-100.) In the one personal interview
experiment that has come to our attention, on obtaining reports of savings accounts
from 151 households conducted by the Survey Research Center in 1959, the
cooperation rate was 67 percent among those offered no compensation and was
much less. 52 percent. when respondents were offered ten dollars [6]. This drop,
however. may have been due to suspicion on the part of respondents of the purposes
of the study and also to misunderstandings about the method by interviewers, as
noted by the authors. (6, p. 127.) Although isolated instances have been encountered
of people refusing to cooperate with a university study if offered remuneration
the boomerang effect ("What business has a university doing in giving people
money when they're always asking for money ...?")--it is hard to imagine such
a phenomenon taking place on a wide scale.
In another area of study, a statistically significant increase inresponse was
obtained in an HEW-sponsored study where a $10 cash offerwas made to about
600 randomly selected members of a low-income sampleas an inducement to come
in for a medical check-up [7]. The proportion consentingto do so rose from 70 to
82 with the cash offer.
Panel Personal Interriews
A noncontrolled test of the effect of compensationon households interviewed
periodically was also carried out as part of the ConsumerSavings Project during
the course ofa panel study of saving behaviorof 170families in Chicago in 1957-58.
[4] At the interviewer's discretion,an initial gift of merchandise or a magazine
subscription which cost the project between $2.50and $4.50 was offered to the
respondent. Circumstantial evidence basedon interviewer evaluations indicated
that:
An advance offer of a gift helpedsecure cooperation in about one-fifth
of the background interviews. The giftwas felt to be particularly effective
322among lower income groups, whereas when higher income people were
offered gifts, the interviewer was often rebuked for doing so.
(if those offered gills about nine out of ten accepted. Though it is not
clear whether the acceptance of a gift was cause or effect, those who accepted
gifts were generally much more cooperative than those who did not,par-
ticularly in their willingness to supply all the data requested. Those whowere
not offered gifts also withheld data more frequently than the average, though
it is not clear whether offer of a gift might have improved matters.
A pronounced improvement in rapport was obtained on the fourth
wave of the panel operation when a newspaper story on the project was sent
to panel members with the advance letter and just after all panel members
had been sent a surprise gift of a box of assorted cheeses. (4.pp. 26-29.)
While this evidence is by no means as conclusive as that from a controlled
experiment, the fact remains that all indications pointed to a positive effect of
compensation on cooperation, as well as on report validity. On the other hand,a
very different experience is reported by Dohrenwend in offering compensation in
a small two-wave study in Manhattan seeking information on urban living styles
[3). On the first wave, half the respondents were offered five dollars compensation
while half were not. On the second wave, those respondents who had received
compensation were offered an additional five dollars and half of the respondents
who had not received compensation on the first wave were offered five dollars for
cooperating on the second wave. There was no significant difference in cooperation
among the three procedures-65 percent of households who were never compen-
sated cooperated on both waves as compared to 61 percent of respondents who
were offered compensation on both waves and 53 percent of respondents who were
offered compensation for Wave 2 only. For Wave I only, the results were in the
opposite direction, 56 percent of respondents who were offered compensation
cooperated compared to 50 percent of those who were not compensated. Since the
sample sizes for each of the two groups in the first wave consisted of about 80
respondents and the sample size in Wave 2 was also about 80, none of the dif-
feretices is significant.
The lack of effect of compensation may be due to the topic of the study, which
dealt with urban living and attitudes toward the community. Unlike expenditure
or savings surveys that may require substantial memory effort or looking up
records, most community attitude surveys are not difficult or threatening. It may
also he due to the manner of administration; the compensation offer was made by
mail and referred to it as an "honorarium." a word that lower and middle income
people would find hard to understand.
C. Panel Diary Studies
The four studies reviewed under this heading were conducted by two organiza-
tions, two by the Social Survey in England and two by the Survey Research
Laboratory (SRL)of the University of Illinois. The first two studies related to the
United Kingdom and are reported by Kemsley and Nicholson 15]. In one study,
conducted in 1951 by the Social Survey, households were asked to keep an expendi-
ture record for one week. The sample was divided randomly into three groups of
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ceived five shillings for cooperating and the third group received tenshillings.
The cooperation rate for contacted households was 52 percent for (hose receiving
no compensation. 62 percent for hose receiving fiveshillings and 67 percent for
those receiving ten shillings.
In the second study, a later and somewhat looser experimentS respondents
were offered 25 shillings to keep a diary fir four weeks. Amongcontacted house-
holds, 47 percent kept a diary for four weeks. Although there was no control group
in this survey, Kemsley and Nicholson speculated that a higher cooperation rate
could have been obtained had the compensation rate been still higher, but to our
knowledge there have been no additional British experiments on compensation
since their 1960 paper.
The two experiments of SRL in obtaining consumer expenditures by diary
methods that involved compensation indicate that compensation increased
cooperation by 10 to 15 percentage points for periods of two or three weeks and
by about 25 percentage points for four weeks [8, 10].
In the first experiment, conducted in 1969 in the Springfield and Rock Island,
Illinois. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 525 respondents were randomly
divided into four groups who received the following treatments:
I. Nogft. This group did receive a plastic folder and ballpoint pen both
labeled "University of Illinois" for use in recordkeeping. These items, which
retailed for about 51.00, were not mentioned as gifts hut households were allowed
to keep them.
Swnmarv and comparison of purchases. A report of respondent purchases
by major categories and compared with the purchases of other panel families with
similar incomes.
LargeStationer v holder. A large padded stationery holder with pen,
retailing for about 55.00, to contain the diaries during the recordkeeping period.
Respondents were told the holder was a gift for keeping the diary.
ilnierica,ifla', posters, orgoi'ernment pithlica:ions. A choice of an American
flag with holder, posters of Illinois history or one of 40 popular Government
Printing Office publications, again averaging about 55.00 in value. (It is interesting
that roughly two-thirds of this group chose the American flag)
Within each of these groups, respondents were asked to keep diaries for
periods of one, two, three, and four weeks. Thus, all respondents were asked to
keep a diary for at least one week, three..quarters were asked to keep a diary for at
least two weeks, half were asked to keep a diary for at least three weeks, andone-
fourth were asked to keep a diary for four weeks.
The percent cooperating by week and by type of giftare given in Table 1.
Although the initial effect of some gift on agreement to keepa diary is small, the
differences in rate of cooperation are eight percentage points forone week, 13
percentage points for two or three weeks and about 25 percentage points for four
weeks. Interestingly enough, the nonmerchandise offer (of providingpurchase
comparisons) seems to have been more effective than the othertwo, at least in
terms of cooperation.
The results are confirmed by a more recent 1972 study by SRLin the Chicago
SMSA [10]. In this study 409 respondents were askedto keep diaries for two weeks,
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TABLE I




No Some comparisonstationery Flag or
Extent of Cooperation gift gift of purchases holder book
Note: Percentages in this table are the number of households keeping given number of diaries as a
percent of those asked to keep a diary for at least that length of time, for that type of gift. The base
figures. in parentheses, are the number of households asked to keep a diary for at least that length of time.
Thus, the 90 keeping two diaries and who received no gift is the number of households asked to keep the
diary for two, three, or four weeks.
Source: (8. p. 728).
with a $5.00 check offered to a randomized half. The cooperation rate for house-
holds who were compensated was 79 percent for two weeks compared to a coopera-
tion rate of 67 percent for those not compensated, a percentage point difference of
12 percent. This same difference was obtained in comparing the data for the one
week cooperation rate-85 percent for compensated households and 73 percent for
households not compensated.
This most recent experiment provides some data on the differential effect of
compensation by education and/or income level. In this study, which covered the
Chicago SMSA. significant differences were found between the effects of compensa-
lion in tne City of Chicago and in suburban areas. In the suburbs. compensation
had no effect on cooperation-85 percent of contacted households cooperated
regardless ofcompensation. In the City of Chicago, 85 percent of contacted house-
holds who received compensation cooperated, while only 68 percent of those who
received no compensation cooperated.
The obvious differences between city and suburban households are in the two
social class variables. income and education. Lower income city households
generally find record-keeping more difficult while at the same time the com-
pensation they get has greater marginal utility. Thus, compensation helps to reduce
(he panel biases against low income households. Panels generally get lower
cooperation from very small households (one or two members) and very high
income households, but compensation seems to have no effect on these biases.
Since low income households spend less, the mean expenditures with these
households included will be lower than if they are not in the panel. These results
are confounded, however, by the results of the next section that indicate that com-
pensation may influence the accuracy of reporting.
Auspices. What limited data are available indicate that compensation has the
same effects of increasing cooperation regardless of auspices. In the 1972 study in
the Chicago SMSA just discussed [10]. for half the sample, the advance letter was
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Agreed to keep diary 857(113) 89.6(412) 88.3(I28) 92.0(125) 88.7(159)
Kept at least one diary 77.1(113) 84.7(412) 85.9(128) 90.4(125) 79.2(159)
Kept at least two diaries 62.1(90) 75.1(297) 71.1(90) 82.6(101) 71.3(106)
Kept at least three diaries 54.1(61) 67.0(198) 66.7(63) 70.2)66) 643(6))
Kept four diaries 23.1(30) 48.6(96) 54.8(31) 39.4(31) 51.4(34)on U.S. Bureau of the Censusstationery and signed by its 1)irector. The diaries
also had the Bureau of the Census headings onthem. and interviewers said that
they were acting as collecting agents for the Bureauof the Census. In the other half
of the sample, advance letters. diaries, and interviewers were all identified as from
the tJniversity of Illinois. In the City of Chicago, for University of Illinois auspices.
compensation increased the cooperation rate 14 percentage points from 75 to
89 percent, and for Census Bureau auspices, compensation increased cooperation
17 percentage points, from 64 to 81 percent. Compensation had no effect in the
suburbs in either case.
All things considered, the evidence from these studies would seem to support
the hypothesized effects of compensation, at least as applied to cooperation. The
evidence, though relatively sparse, supports the positive effects of compensation
on cooperation in the case of diarystudies with the principal effects being in areas
more heavily populated with lower income and more poorly educated households.
The evidence is more mixed in the case of personal interview studies.
4. EFFECT ON VALIDITY
Little information is available on the effect of compensation on report validity,
partly no doubt because of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary validating data.
As a result, perhaps. some ofthe past studies have not considered this question at all.
Yet in many ways, this is the key question, for one may argue that the ultimate
objective ofcoinpensation is not to raise response rates for their own sake, butas a
means of improving the validity of the resulting information.
In theory, there need be no relation between the cooperation effect and the
validity effect. Thus, if compensation brings about no increase in responserate but
a substantial improvement in the validity of the data reported by those who do
cooperate, the extra cost and effort could be judged well worth it; whereas if the
response rate were to rise markedly but with no improvement in data quality, the
use of compensation would be highly questionable. It is therefore all themore
unfortunate that so few results are availableon this aspect, and many of these are
only circumstantial.
A priori one would expect compensation to improvereport validity, in the
sense that the offer of compensation conveys to the respondenta moral obligation
to devote more effort or thought to providing the requested information,whether
from memory or by diary methods. However,on this basis it could be argued that
the effect should he greater where diarymethods arc used than recall by personal
interview, beca use greater effort isrequired to keep diaries, except if the respondent
is being asked to furnish data fromrecords.
With these thoughts asa frame of reference, let us look at what the data have
to show. As will be seen, it is particularly difficultto draw any firm conclusions in
view of the very few studies and the lack of validatinginformation on expenditures.
The absence of the latter is especiallyfrustrating, for it means that data validity
has to be interred indirectly.The criterion used in suchcases is that "more means
better.In other words,more reports of expenditure and higher outlaysper house-
hold are considered to reflectmore valid data, on the premise that expenditures are
being reported that wouldotherwise be omitted. This hassome basis in the well-
326known tendency of household survey' data to understate expenditureaggregates
but does not make arty allowance for telescoping effects thatcan act in the opposite
direction. Indications from our data, however,are that the former effectis
predominant [9].
Four of the studies reported earlier contained some information relatingto
validity effects, and those aspects of those studiesare reviewed here, In the one-
time personal interview Survey Research Center study reportedby Lansing,
Ginsburg and Braaten [6], no significant differences in reporting of savingsaccounts
were found between compensated and non-compensated households, because of
small sample sizes. Nevertheless, the results reproduced from that study in Table 2
indicate a slightly higher tendency for heads of households whowere compensated
to report ownership of a savings account, and to report more accurately the balance
in the account, if they were willing to statea balance, than non-compensated heads.
The personal interview savings panel [4] describedon pp. 322-3 yielded
circumstantial evidence of improved data accompanying the offer of compensation.
Despite the lack of controls, the evidence was fairly strong thatamong lower in-
come households, offer of compensation increased their willingness to reporton
their saving behavior both initially as well as at a later stage in the panel. The
findings of that study suggest that the impact of compensationwears off over time
and that a follow-up gift is well worth considering.
The two SRL diary experiments in obtaining expenditure data yielded mixed
results on the effect of compensation on report validity [8. 10]. In the 1969 SRL
study, households who received some gift reported higher levels of expenditures
than those who received no gift, as shown in Table 3. The differences increasedeach
week, from nine percent the first week to 18 percent the second week to about 60
percent in weeks three and four. Over all four weeks, households receivinga gift
reported 17 percent more expenditures than did households who did not geta gift.
These results were not confirmed in the 1972 SRL study [10]. Controlling for
city-suburban and diary-phone procedures, no significant differenceswere found
in total expenditures, for food products only. or by individual product classtypes.
We can only speculate why compensation affected reportingon the earlier
experiment but not on the later one. The earlier experiment tested periodsup to
four weeks, and the greatest differences between compensated andnon-
compensated households were found in the third and fourth weeks. Thus, shorten-
ing the recordkeeping period reduces the effects of compensation on level of diary
reporting. Still for the first two weeks combined, there was more thana ten percent
difference in level of reported expenditures between compensated andnon-
compensated households on the earlier experiment, as compared tono difference
on the later experiment. Aside from sampling errors, there may have been some
interviewer effects since the previous study stressed gifts as a major variable, with
three different gifts being tested, while in the 1972 study the major variablewas the
use of telephones.
5. NATURE OF COMPENSATION
For,n. There is little evidence to indicate that the form of compensation has
any significant effect on cooperation or accuracy of reporting. A wide variety of
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Source: (6, p. 128).
gifts as well as money have been used for compensation, with no strong evidence
of differential effects. This was illustrated in Table 1 by the response rates for three
different forms of compensation given in the 1969 SRL diary experiment [8]. While
the large stationery holder obtained slightly higher cooperation rates than the
other gifts in the first three weeks, none of the differences was significant. In the
fourth week, these cooperation rates reversed and cooperation was lowest (or
households who received the stationery holder.
Other non-experimental evidence also indicates no differences in cooperation
by type of compensation. The 1972 SRL experiment used money for compensation,
as did the British Survey reported by Kemsley and Nicholson [5]. There were no
substantial differences in cooperation between these studies and the results in
Table 1. Also. MRCA uses gifts while Nielsen uses money and both panels have
about the same level of cooperation.
The results of Table 3 indicate that the form of the gift hasno effect on the
level of reporting. For the four weeks, the average weekly expenditure didnot vary
by more than an insignificant seven dollars from themean by type of gift. Obviously,
it would be possible to bias expenditure data by gifts that influenced future purchase
behavior. For this reason, gifts are never chosen from thesame expenditure cate-
gories as are being measured. Thus, if one were measuring food consumption.one
would avoid gifts of goods related to food preparation.
Lerel and Frequency. If recordkeeping is consideredonerous. one would
expect that cooperation would increase with increased compensation.The re!ation
is probably curvilinear, however. Respondents havea vague idea what their efforts
are worth, and payments far above this level mightwell result in suspicion by
respondents and anxiety among interviewersthat would reduce cooperation.
Similarly, compensation much belowthe expected level might be treated as no
compensation. In the range of reasonable compensation levels,the cooperation









Failed to report account 26 IS 32 24 30
Account owned by respondent or spouse
or the two jointly II II 12 II) I?
Account owned entirely or in part by someone
other than respondent and spouse 15 7 20 14 18
Reported account, balance not ascertained 15 27 4 10 is
Report balance for account 59 55 64 66 52
Underreported by $1,000 or more 10 4 (6 14 6
Overreported by S 1,000 or more 4 4 14
Accurate within $1,000 45 47 48 38 46
Total 100 100 100 100 lOU
Number of interviews 89 26 25 21 17L
1AHE.E 3
RLP0Rf[o !OFAL. 1:XtFNtMTljpF.5 PIR IIO!JSEJIO!I)BylYl'! fl> (.1>1 AN!> WFIK
Source: (8, p. 732).
The only published evidence we know of is the Kemsley and Nicholson
study {5] discussed earlier which indicated that response increased from 62 to 67
percent as the compensation level increased from five to ten shillings. When the
time period was increased to four weeks, however, increasing thecompensation to
25 shillings still resulted in a lower cooperation rate.
Nothing is published about the effects of leel of compensationon accuracy
of recording expenditures. One suspects, however, thataccuracy is less sensitive
to level of compensation than is cooperation, so that changes in compensation
that do affect cooperation would not affect recording levels.
Perhaps more important than level of compensation is the frequency of
reinforcement in the case of panel studies covering periods longer thanone or two
weeks. MRCA and Nielsen reward respondents each timea diary or cartridge is
mailed. The SRL results in Tables 1 and 3 suggest thatan additional gift in (he
fourth week might have increased cooperation. The results of the 1957 savings
panel experiment, discussed onpp. 322-3, suggest strongly that follow-up gifts can
have noticeable effects on respondent's cooperativeness, especially ina panel
study extending over many months.
6. SUMMARY ANt) IMPL!CATIONS
As must be evident from this sketchy review, the effects of compensationon
consumer expenditure or saving data have been the subject of relatively few studies.
Since this past work has been mostly in the nature ofcase studies, any results
cannot be considered definitive but rather more in the nature of hypotheses for
further investigation.
What does seem to emerge is that the effects of compensation in such studies
vary depending on whether the study is based on one-time interviews or on a panel
approach, and depending on whether or not the sample membersare asked to keep
written records. For one-time interviews with no written records, there is little
evidence either way that compensation improves the results either from the point
of view of cooperation or report validity. Compensationmay well be effective in
such cases if respondents are being asked to go out of their way to do something,
like taking time to subject themselves to a medical examination.
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holder Hag or hook
I $l24(85 S135(327) I4I(97) S136(105) SI29(125(
2 107 (42) 126 (207) 122 (57) 113 (74) 142 (76)
3 89(20) 142(120) (44(37) 140(41) 141 (42)
4 6l(7) 96(46) 96(13) 76(16) 115(171
Four Week
average Sl12(i54) S131 (700) 5133 (204) 5126 (236) 5133 (260)In panel studies, whether bypersonal interview or by written record-keeping,
there are indications that someform of conipensatiOfl will contribute to a higher
rate of response as well as to morecomplete and accurate information. To )udge
from the experiences reportedfrom the one personal interview panel covered in
this paper, rapport withpanel members can be improved greatly by offering some
form of cnipensatiofl after three orfour interviews. Continuing interaction with
the panel members either inthe form of compensation or by offering them reports
on earlier results orother types of information seems toimprove willingness to
participate in the panel.
The effects of compensation areespecially clear in obtaining higher response
for even short periods of time ifsample members are requested to keep written
records of expenditures. In all thiecstudies covered in this paper, marked increases
in the rate of response seem to haveoccurred as a result of compensation.* These
increases were concentrated mostly amongfamilies with lower incomes and less
education. Despite this clear effect on the rateof response. however, the apparent
effects on report validity are mixed. Whereasin some instances compensation
apparently induced higher report validity, in otherinstances it seemed to have no
effect. The best that can be said in the latter caseis that in such instances the initial
cost of compensation seems to be offsetby reduced field costs brought about by
the higher rate of response. so that neithertotal cost nor cost per unit of informa-
tion is affected adversely by compensation.
One finding that runs counter to the hypothesesadvanced on page 321 is that
form of compensation seems to have little effect on either the rate of response or
report validity. To be sure, no clearly commercial offerings (such as asubscription
to a popular magazine) were made in any of these studies, butit does appear that
for a wide range of relatively non-commercial possibilities the effect of compensa-
tion is not likely to be influenced by the specific form used.
In view of these findings and inferences, one may well ask from a practical
survey point of view when and under what conditions compensation would seem
advisable in studies of this type. In our opinion, there does not seem to he much
basis at the present time for offering compensation on one-time interviews. There
does, however, seem to be a clear rationale for offering compensation on a panel
study, whether or not information is sought by written recordkeeping by the
respondents, and whether or not the study is being conducted by a governmental or
non-profit agency. In terms of cooperation the results are likely to be much better,
while in terms of report validity the results are likely to be at least as good as if no
compensation were offered. The cost analyses from the two SRL diary studies
indicate that the higher rates of response brought about by the compensation
serves to more than offset their costs, with the result that the total cost of the
survey and the cost per interview is not increased, and may even decrease. Thus, the
interviewer and field supervisory costs to recruit a household to keep a diary for
two weeks are about S30 at current rates of S2.50 per hour for interviewers. To
* Such improvement was not obtained inan experimental siudy offering renumeration in the 1972
Survey of Consumer Expenditures, based on preliminary data reported at this Conference by Barbara
Bailar for the first week's diary. The cooperation rate was already very high, about 90 percent, so not
much room remained for further improvement. Even so, more extensive analysis of these data is clearly
indicated.
330recruit fifteen additional households per hundred would cost about $450. The
compensation costs for all75-80recruited households per hundred would cost
$400 or less at a rate of $5 per household.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these results are based on sparse
evidence and much more research is needed on this question. In particular. very
little information exists on the effects of varying the amount or the frequency of
compensation on the two criteria we have used in this paper, as well as on cost.
Research is also needed on the effect of the time period on these results as well as of
the type of approach and the methods of interviewer training.
Finally, no work whatsoever seems to have been done to investigate the effects
of compensation in rural areas. We suspect that such effects will also depend on the
educational and income levels of the population, and will hence be greater in the
lower income areas, but on the other hand these effects may be mitigated by the
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